Credible Equilibria in Games with Utility Changing during the Play

Publicado por Tilburg Center Economic Research 1992Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflicto In this paper we propose an extensiveform game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games

Monotonic games are spanning network games

Game Theory

Credible Equilibria in Games with Utility Changing during the Play

Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflict. In this paper we propose an extensive-form game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games.Publicad

Coreness of Cooperative Games with Truncated Submodular Profit Functions

Coreness represents solution concepts related to core in cooperative games, which captures the stability of players. Motivated by the scale effect in social networks, economics and other scenario, we study the coreness of cooperative game with truncated submodular profit functions. Specifically, the profit function $f(\cdot)$ is defined by a truncation of a submodular function $\sigma(\cdot)$: $f(\cdot)=\sigma(\cdot)$ if $\sigma(\cdot)\geq\eta$ and $f(\cdot)=0$ otherwise, where $\eta$ is a given threshold. In this paper, we study the core and three core-related concepts of truncated submodular profit cooperative game. We first prove that whether core is empty can be decided in polynomial time and an allocation in core also can be found in polynomial time when core is not empty. When core is empty, we show hardness results and approximation algorithms for computing other core-related concepts including relative least-core value, absolute least-core value and least average dissatisfaction value

Bright and dark excitons in an atom--pair filled optical lattice within a cavity

We study electronic excitations of a degenerate gas of atoms trapped in pairs in an optical lattice. Local dipole-dipole interactions produce a long lived antisymmetric and a short lived symmetric superposition of individual atomic excitations as the lowest internal on-site excitations. Due to the much larger dipole moment the symmetric states couple efficiently to neighbouring lattice sites and can be well represented by Frenkel excitons, while the antisymmetric dark states stay localized. Within a cavity only symmetric states couple to cavity photons inducing long range interactions to form polaritons. We calculate their dispersion curves as well as cavity transmission and reflection spectra to observe them. For a lattice with aspherical sites bright and dark states get mixed and their relative excitation energies depend on photon polarizations. The system should allow to study new types of solid state phenomena in atom filled optical lattices